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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The Convery court echoes New York case law in refusing to find a sepa-
rate cause of action for negligent supervision,57 but it does recognize a
cause of action within the limits of reasonable foreseeability against per-
sons with a special relationship to the child.58 Under this analysis, a par-
ent will be "liable for failure to exercise reasonable care, precaution and
vigilance" as measured by the child's understanding of the risks of injury
and their foreseeability by the parent. 59 Therefore, under the Conveg
approach, parents will continue to be immunized for most injuries result-
ing from daily occurrences, yet the child will be protected from situations
involving inherent danger.
Although the Romanik court's decision to delay resolution of the paren-
tal supervision issue may lead to less confusion in Minnesota than now
exists in Michigan and Wisconsin, Minnesota presently has no clear rule
to follow. It is hoped that the court will consider the Conveg approach in
arriving at a definitive solution. Meanwhile, Romanik evinces the princi-
ple that parental instruction sufficiently negligent to constitute an affir-
mative act endangering a child is outside both exceptions to the
abrogation of the parent-child immunity doctrine.
Workers' Compensation.-IrrERVENORS' RIGHT TO
REIMBURSEMENT-Brooks v. A.M.F, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 310 (Minn.
1979).
Many Minnesota workers covered by workers' compensation, also
57. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 47, 324 N.E.2d 338, 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 868 (1974).
58. See Convery v. Maczka, 163 N.J. Super. at 416, 394 A.2d at 1253.
59. Id.
1. Under the Minnesota workers' compensation law, MINN. STAT. §§ 176.011-.82
(1978 & Supp. 1979), an injured employee is entitled to compensation from the employer's
compensation carrier for an injury shown to be work related. See id. § 176.021(1) (1978)
("arising out of and in the course of employment").
Nearly all Minnesota workers are covered under the Minnesota workers' compensa-
tion law for work-related illness and injury. See id. § 176.041(1) (Supp. 1979) (excluding
employees of railroads engaged in interstate commerce, family farm employees, various
other agricultural workers, and certain other occupations from coverage by workers' com-
pensation). In 1973, 38,953 work-related injuries were reported in Minnesota. By 1978,
this number had increased to 55,536. See MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION STUDY
COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR 205 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as STUDY COMM'N].
Workers' compensation statutes were enacted by state legislatures throughout the na-
tion starting in 1902. See I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.20
(1978). Their purpose was to assure speedy compensation by employers to workers for
work-related injuries. See, e.g., New York C.R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917). By
1920, all but eight states had adopted compensation acts. See I A. LARSON, Supra, § 5.30,
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carry private health insurance.2 Private health insurance policies often
exclude coverage for claims compensable by workers' compensation.3
Thus, the private health insurer has an obvious interest in how the pro-
ceeds of a compensation award are to be distributed. 4 For this reason,
the Minnesota court has long recognized the right of health insurers to
intervene for possible reimbursement in workers' compensation proceed-
ings when the insured carries a policy that excludes payment for occupa-
tional sickness or injury.
5
at 39. The rapid spread of such statutes was largely a response to obstacles encountered
by workers in seeking compensation under common law, which gave employers three de-
fenses against employee claims for liability. One defense gave employers immunity for
injuries caused by fellow workers. See, e.g., Foster v. Minnesota C. Ry., 14 Minn. 360, 364
(Gil. 277, 281) (1869). Another defense removed or mitigated employer liability when the
employer could show the worker had assumed the risk of incurring work-related injuries.
See, e.g., De Greif v. Northwestern Knitting Co., 106 Minn. 15, 19, 118 N.W. 558, 560
(1908). A third defense-contributory negligence-barred recovery against the employer
when the worker was partly at fault, however slight. See 1 A. LARSON, supra, § 5.20, at 38;
cf. Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 126 Minn. 286, 295, 148 N.W. 71, 75 (1914) (workers'
compensation law provides for recovery without regard to negligence). Seegenerally Asher,
The Ortgins of Workmen's Compensation in Minnesota, 44 MINN. HIST. 142 (1974).
2. According to the court in Lemmer v. Batzli Elec. Co., 267 Minn. 8, 125 N.W.2d
434 (1963), "[i]t has become a somewhat common practice for an employee to insure
against injury arising outside his employment, thus complementing the protection pro-
vided him under the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. at 18, 125 N.W.2d at 441.
3. See, e.g., Vetsch v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, 283 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Minn. 1979);
Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 310, 311 (Minn. 1979).
4. See, e.g., Vetsch v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, 283 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Minn. 1979)
(health insurer not a party to settlement entitled to full reimbursement of money paid on
behalf of employee under insurance policy that excluded claims covered by workers' com-
pensation); Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc., 278 N.W.2d at 311 (workers' compensation procedures
whereby intervenor, excluded from settlement negotiations, received reimbursement only
after proving employee's injuries were work related, held to be inadequate); Repo v. Capi-
tol Elevator Co., 312 Minn. 364, 367-70, 252 N.W.2d 248, 250-51 (1977) (health insurer
entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid under policy that excluded coverage of claims
compensable under workers' compensation); Tatro v. Hartmann's Store, 295 Minn. 282,
286, 204 N.W.2d 125, 127-28 (1973) (denying health insurer's right to intervene after set-
tlement because substantial prejudice could result to employee; urging adoption of new
procedures to protect intervenors); Lemmer v. Batzli Elec. Co., 267 Minn. 8, 20-21, 125
N.W.2d 434, 442 (1963) (health insurer entitled to intervene in workers' compensation
proceeding to obtain reimbursement from employee's award when insurance policy ex-
cluded coverage for work-related illness or injury); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v.
Bachrach, 265 Minn. 83, 90-91, 120 N.W.2d 327, 332-33 (1963) (health insurer entitled to
restitution from employee's compensation award for benefits paid under policy that ex-
cluded occupational injury).
5. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Bachrach, 265 Minn. 83, 89, 120 N.W.2d
327, 332 (1963). In Bachrach, the defendant-worker received private health insurance ben-
efits after asserting that his injury was not work related. See id. at 84, 120 N.W.2d at 329.
Later, the defendant, in seeking payment from his employer under the workers' compensa-
tion law, successfully claimed that his injury was work related. See id. at 84-85, 120
N.W.2d at 329. A compensation referee directed that the employer's liability should be
offset by amounts that the private insurer previously had paid, but the Industrial Commis-
1980]
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The right of health insurers to intervene may be exercised in two cir-
cumstances. First, health insurers that have paid benefits may intervene
in any court proceeding involving workers' compensation claims. 6 If the
injury is shown to be work related 7 at trial, the injured worker is awarded
compensation and the health insurer is reimbursed from the award.8
The second situation occurs when the injured worker and the compensa-
tion carrier settle the claim. In this case, the health insurer's remedy is
intervention and participation in an out-of-court stipulation of settle-
ment. 9 Before Brooks v. A.MF, Inc. ,IO if the worker and the compensa-
sion, a precursor of the Workers' Compensation Board, rejected this determination on the
grounds that it was outside of the Commission's jurisdiction. See id. at 87, 120 N.W.2d at
330-31. The plaintiff-insurer then petitioned for and received a favorable summary judg-
ment in the district court. See id. at 83, 120 N.W.2d at 329. The supreme court affirmed
the insurer's summary judgment for reimbursement. See id. at 91, 120 N.W.2d at 333.
According to the supreme court in Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 310 (Minn.
1979), "Bachrach made clear that once it is established that a sickness or injury is occupa-
tional, a health insurer is entitled to reimbursement of payments made to its insured under
a policy excluding such claims." Id. at 313.
6. See, e.g., Lemmer v. Batzli Elec. Co., 267 Minn. 8, 17-18, 125 N.W.2d 434, 441
(1963). The Lemmer court recognized that the advantages of this type of relief were
preventing multiple litigation, providing the insurer with greater certainty of reim-
bursement, eliminating the possibility of double recovery by the worker, and encouraging
the insurer to pay health benefits promptly. See id. at 19, 125 N.W.2d at 441.
Minnesota workers' compensation law provides a right of intervention to any person
who has an interest in the outcome of a compensation order or decision. See MINN. STAT.
§ 176.361 (1978). Rules have been promulgated to govern intervention in workers' com-
pensation proceedings. See MINN. WORK. COMP. PRAC. R. 18.
Other jurisdictions have also recognized the right of insurers to intervene in compen-
sation claims. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 578 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[An
insurance carrier providing coverage for non-occupational injuries and illnesses may inter-
vene in proceedings under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' [Compensation] Act
. . . and recover amounts paid out for injuries or illnesses that are found to be work-
related."); cf. Tierney v. Montefiore Hosp., 23 A.D.2d 704, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1965) (per
curiam) (reversing decision of workers' compensation board denying reimbursement to
third party for hospital care given to injured compensation recipient). But cf. In re Gould's
Case, 355 Mass. 66, 72, 242 N.E.2d 748, 752 (1968) ("[The Industrial Accident] board...
should not be required in compensation proceedings to interpret and apply the provisions
of this private contractual disability plan."); Rhodes v. Automotive Ignition Co., 218 Pa.
Super. Ct. 281, 286, 275 A.2d 846, 849 (1971) (intervention of auto insurer claiming subro-
gation rights not permitted in workers' compensation proceeding).
7. As a prerequisite to liability for a compensation award, the injury must be shown
to arise "out of and in the course of employment." MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1978).
8. See, e.g., Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc., 278 N.W.2d at 313 (Minn. 1979) (intervening
health insurers entitled to reimbursement from proceeds of compensation award) (citing
Lemmer v. Batzli Elec. Co., 267 Minn. 8, 19,125 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1963)); Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y v. Bachrach, 265 Minn. 83, 89, 120 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1963) (health in-
surer entitled to reimbursement of payment made for occupational sickness or injury
under policy excluding such claims).
9. Out-of-court settlements are sanctioned by the workers' compensation law and
the Rules of Practice of the Workers' Compensation Board and the Workers' Compensa-
tion Division. See MINN, STAT. § 176.521 (1978 & Supp. 1979) (settlements valid when
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tion carrier settled, the health insurance intervenor was forced to either
forego reimbursement or prove in a separate proceeding that the injury
was work related. The Brooks court established new procedures to be
followed in allowing reimbursement to health insurers upon intervention
and subsequent out-of-court settlement of workers' compensation claims.
Brooks was a consolidation of two actions12 brought on appeal by sev-
signed by parties and intervenors, and approved by Workers' Compensation Division);
MINN. WORK. COMP. PRAC. R. 23 (establishing procedure for filing and approving settle-
ment stipulations).
From 1973 through 1978, 75% of the cases (17,165 of 22,747) filed for hearing before
the Workers' Compensation Division were settled by stipulation. Se STUDY COMM'N,
supra note 1, at 205. The judiciary generally encourages out-of-court settlements as a way
to save the litigants expense and lighten the court's caseload. See, e.g., Williams v. First
Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910) (courts favor compromises of disputed claims); Pfi-
zer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 543 (8th Cir.) ("The policy of the law encourages compro-
mise to avoid the uncertainties of the outcome of litigation as well as the avoidance of
wasteful litigation and expense incident thereto."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972); Hent-
schel v. Smith, 278 Minn. 86, 92, 153 N.W.2d 199, 204 (1967) ("This court has always
supported a strong public policy favoring the settlement of disputed claims without litiga-
tion.").
10. 278 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. 1979).
11. In Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Bachrach, 265 Minn. 83, 120 N.W.2d 327
(1963), the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that health insurers are entitled to reim-
bursement when an injured worker establishes the work-related nature of an injury before
a workers' compensation tribunal. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. Subse-
quently, in Lemmer v. Batzli Elec. Co., 267 Minn. 8, 125 N.W.2d 434 (1963), the court
further recognized the right of health insurers to intervene in workers' compensation pro-
ceedings and to be reimbursed from the proceeds of the award. See note 6 supra and
accompanying text.
The rights of intervenors under circumstances in which the employee has settled the
claim were first addressed by the Minnesota court in Tatro v. Hartmann's Store, 295
Minn. 282, 204 N.W.2d 125 (1973). Although Taro denied the health insurer the right to
intervene after the claim had been settled, see id. at 286, 204 N.W.2d at 127-28, the
supreme court did call for procedures to be instituted to prevent the reocurrence of the
situation in Tatro. See id. at 286, 204 N.W.2d at 128. Following Taro, procedures were
instituted to ensure that interested parties would be notified of their right to intervene. See
Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc., 278 N.W.2d at 314; MINN. WORK. COMP. PRAC. R. 17-18.
In Repo v. Capitol Elevator Co., 312 Minn. 364, 252 N.W.2d 248 (1977), an injured
worker settled his claim with the employer-insurer. See id. at 365-66, 252 N.W.2d at 249.
Successfully proving in a separate proceeding that the injury was work related, the inter-
vening health insurer was reimbursed. See id. at 366-67, 252 N.W.2d at 250. The Repo
court upheld the reimbursement and approved the new procedures that the commission
had adopted. See id. at 368-69, 252 N.W.2d at 251.
According to the Brooks court, under pre-Brooks law "an intervenor who has not been
included as a participant in settlement negotiation between the employee and employer-
insurer is awarded reimbursement only after it proves that the employee's injuries are
work related." 278 N.W.2d at 311.
12. See 278 N.W.2d at 312. One of the injured workers, Myles Brooks, allegedly suf-
fered permanent injury when he fell and severely fractured his right wrist in July of 1976
while working as a tile and linoleum remover. See Relator-Intervenor's Brief and Appen-
dix (Brooks) at 2. Elmer Hendrickson, the other injured worker, suffered a severe, heart
1980]
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eral health insurance intervenors.13 Both injured employees received
health insurance benefits for their injuries and subsequently filed claims
for workers' compensation benefits.14 The employees' health insurance
policies excluded coverage of occupational injuries covered by workers'
compensation laws.15 Instead of proceeding before the Workers' Com-
pensation Division, the injured employees settled their claims with the
compensation carriers.t6 After the Workers' Compensation Division ap-
proved the settlements,17 the intervening health insurers, challenging the
fairness of the pre-Brooks procedure,18 appealed to the Workers' Compen-
attack in July of 1975 while supervising an insulation work crew. See Intervenor-Relator,
General American Life Insurance Company's Brief and Appendix (Hendrickson) at A-2.
13. See 278 N.W.2d at 311. The intervenors were joined by the attorney general as
amicus curiae on behalf of the Department of Public Welfare. See id. at 312. Under Min-
nesota's Medicaid program, MINN. STAT. §§ 256B.01-.40 (1978 & Supp. 1979), an esti-
mated 26% of the claims paid by the Department of Public Welfare ultimately went to
workers' compensation recipients. See Amicus Curiae Brief at 4-5. The Department is
required to collect reimbursement from any third party whose liability is subsequently
established in order to qualify for federal financial assistance under the program. See So-
cial Security Amendments of 1967, § 229(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25)(C) (1976).
14. See 278 N.W.2d at 311-12. On behalf of the injured employee Myles Brooks,
Prudential Insurance Company paid medical bills totaling $2605.90 and Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Minnesota paid hospital bills totaling $1425.70. See id. at 311. On behalf
of Elmer Hendrickson, General American Life Insurance Company paid $3394.55 in med-
ical expenses. See id. at 312.
15. See id. at 311-12.
16. See id. After Myles Brooks filed his claim for compensation, Blue Cross and Pru-
dential were notified of their right to intervene in order to obtain reimbursement. See id.
at 311. Blue Cross interveried at that time, but Prudential did not, relying upon assur-
ances from Brooks' attorney that reimbursement would follow when the Workers' Com-
pensation Division ruled in favor of the injured worker. See id. Although Brooks entered
into a written stipulation of settlement with his employer and the compensation carrier,,
both Prudential and Blue Cross were excluded from participating in the settlement negoti-
ation. See id. at 311-12. Prudential intervened after it received notice that the Workers'
Compensation Division had approved the settlement. See id. at 312.
General American Life Insurance Company intervened in Elmer Hendrickson's com-
pensation claim after the claim had been filed. See id. The compensation carrier at-
tempted to include General American in a separate settlement for 25% reimbursement,
but this attempt failed. See id. Hendrickson and the compensation carrier reached a set-
tlement, ultimately approved by the Workers' Compensation Division, to which General
American was not a party. See id.
17. See id. at 311-12. Workers' compensation settlements, to be valid, must be ap-
proved by the Workers' Compensation Division of the Department of Labor and Industry.
See MINN. STAT. § 176.521(1) (Supp. 1979); id. § 176.521(2) (settlement must be "reason-
able, fair, and in conformity with [law]").
18. See 278 N.W.2d at 311. In Brooks, the court framed the controversy as follows:
At issue is the adequacy of procedures employed by the Workers' Compensation
Division and the court of appeals, by which an intervenor who has not been
included as a participant in settlement negotiation between the employee and
the employer-insurer is awarded reimbursement only after it proves that the em-
ployee's injuries are work related.
Id. These procedures had their genesis in an earlier workers' compensation case, Tatro v.
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sation Court of Appeals.19 After the court of appeals affirmed, 20 the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and ordered full reimbursement for
each of the health insurers. 2 1 The court held that the separate-proceed-
ing requirement gave inadequate protection to the rights of intervenors
in workers' compensation settlement negotiations.
22
The court observed that under pre-Brooks law, it was often economi-
cally unfeasible for the health insurer to conduct an extensive investiga-
tion into the injury because the reimbursement sought was insignificant
compared to investigation costs. 23 In addition, an injured worker who
has received a settlement award has little incentive to cooperate with the
intervenor in proving the work-relatedness of the injury.24 Because these
factors often compel intervenors to forego their claims,25 resulting in the
accrual of unjust enrichment to the worker or the compensation car-
rier, 26 the court concluded that it was "incongruous" to place upon the
intervenor the burden of proving that the injury was work related.27
Furthermore, the court found that the separate-proceeding requirement
Hartmann's Store, 295 Minn. 282, 204 N.W.2d 125 (1973). For a history of the pre-Brooks
rule, see note 11 Isupra.
Although these procedures had been approved by the court in Repo v. Capitol Eleva-
tor Co., 312 Minn. 364, 252 N.W.2d 248 (1977), in its discussion of the involvement of
intervenors in the settlement process, the Rpo court stated: "The employee can, of course,
choose to settle without the sickness and accident insurer's consent, but the insurer will
then be entitled to full reimbursement from the proceeds of the settlement." Id. at 369,
252 N.W.2d at 251. This language in Repo was the source of some confusion, which the
Brooks court sought to clarify. &et 278 N.W.2d at 314-15; notes 38-39 tnfra and accompa-
nying text.
19. See 278 N.W.2d at 312. Workers' compensation claims that are settled must be
approved by the Workers' Compensation Division. Set note 17 supra. Otherwise, claims
must be presented at a hearing before a compensation judge. See MINN. STAT. § 176.371
(1978). Settlements may be set aside by, or compensation awards appealed to the Work-
ers' Compensation Court of Appeals. See id. §§ 176.421-.442. From there, appeals are
taken to the Minnesota Supreme Court. See id. §§ 176.471-.491.
20. See 278 N.W.2d at 312.
21. Seeid. at 311,316.
22. See id. at 311.
23. See id. at 315.
24. See id.
25. Se id. ("Where the reimbursement sought in relationship to the offered settlement
is not substantial, as is the usual case, . . . it is not economically feasible for an intervenor
to make an adequate investigation to permit a fair appraisal of the strength or weakness of
the employee's claim.").
26. See id. In Lemmer v. Batzli Elec. Co., 267 Minn. 8, 125 N.W.2d 434 (1963), the
court noted that permitting health insurers to intervene in workers' compensation pro-
ceedings helped prevent unjust enrichment in the form of double recovery by the worker.
Id. at 19, 125 N.W.2d at 441.
27. 278 N.W.2d at 315; Sf Relator-Intervenor's Brief and Appendix (Brooks) at 16
("A doctor with a $200.00 bill, or a pharmacy with a $50.00 bill, will of necessity go
unpaid as the economics would not justify intervention and attempting to prove that the
disinterested employee's claim arose out of or in the course of his employment.").
1980]
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offends the basic principle of workers' compensation "to place upon in-
dustry the burden of economic loss resulting from work-related injuries
or death."
28
The precise scope of the Brooks holding is summarized in the following
statement by the court: "an intervenor who is excluded from participat-
ing in negotiations resulting in a final settlement and who is not a party
to the settlement stipulation should, on principles of equity and public
policy, be awarded full reimbursement by the settlement award." 29 A
reading of this language indicates that an intervenor is entitled to reim-
bursement only when the intervenor is both excluded from settlement
negotiations and is not a party to the award.30 The rights of the inter-
venor who participates in negotiations but does not agree to the settle-
ment, however, are unclear.
The Brooks decision indicates that an intervenor who participates in
settlement negotiations, but does not agree to settle, might not be enti-
tled to reimbursement. 3 1 The court states that intervenors who partici-
pate can better decide whether to join the settlement or litigate the issue
of the injury being work related. 32 This clearly implies that intervenors
28. 278 N.W.2d at 315; accord, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Frechette, 161 F.2d
318, 321 (8th Cir. 1947); Tatro v. Hartmann's Store, 295 Minn. 282, 287, 204 N.W.2d 125,
128 (1973).
29. 278 N.W.2d at 315 (emphasis added).
30. Prudential and Blue Cross were neither parties to the settlement stipulation nor
included in the settlement negotiations. See id. at 312. General American, while not a
party to Hendrickson's settlement stipulation, was given an offer of settlement by the em-
ployer-insurer. See note 16 supra. Apparently, this involvement did not constitute partici-
pation "in negotiations resulting in a final settlement," 278 N.W.2d at 315, one of the two
elements required by Brooks before the intervenor is entitled to reimbursement. See id.
Although the holding in Brooks could be interpreted to permit reimbursement when
the intervenor is not a party to the settlement, even though the intervenor has participated
in negotiations, this does not appear to be the intention of the court. See notes 31-35 in/Ia
and accompanying text.
An implicit corollary to the holding of automatic reimbursement in Brooks is that the
health insurer must be an intervenor in the matter. See 278 N.W.2d at 315. Before a
workers' compensation settlement is approved by the Workers' Compensation Division,
other insurers must be given notice by the petitioner that the claim is pending. See MINN.
WORK. COMP. PRAc. R. 17. As a practical matter, health insurers are entitled to inter-
vene when notified under this rule. See Vetsch v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, 283 N.W.2d
884, 886 (Minn. 1979). Although negotiations may have been conducted and a settlement
reached before the health insurer is given notice of the claim, if the health insurer does
intervene at this time, it will be entitled to automatic reimbursement. See id.
31. See 278 N.W.2d at 314-15 (discussing Repo v. Capitol Elevator Co., 312 Minn.
364, 252 N.W.2d 248, 251 (1977)).
32. See 278 N.W.2d at 315. Statutes in other jurisdictions contemplate the involve-
ment of health insurers in workers' compensation settlement negotiations. See, e.g., CAL.
LAB. CODE § 4903.1(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (referee decides amount of health in-
surer's reimbursement when health insurer does not agree to settle); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, § 671 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (health insurer subrogated to compensation
[Vol. 6
7
et al.: Workers' Compensation—Intervenors' Right to Reimbursement—Brooks
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980
CASE NOTES
who participate in negotiations will not receive automatic reimburse-
ment. 33 By requiring both exclusion of the intervenor from participation
in negotiations and final agreement on the settlement as a prerequisite to
automatic reimbursement, the court struck a just balance between pro-
tection of intervenors' rights and protection of the worker's claim from
the unreasonable refusal of an intervenor to settle.
34
Only weeks after the Brooks decision, the delicate balance established
by the court was upset by the 1979 Minnesota Legislature. In special
session, the Legislature amended the workers' compensation law to re-
quire that a settlement agreement must be signed by the intervenor
before it can be approved by the Workers' Compensation Division.35
The amendment makes no provision for the possibility of unreasonable
refusal to settle a claim. 36 Apparently, an intervenor now has the power
award if this right is agreed upon by the parties or established at a hearing before the
workers' compensation board).
33. See 278 N.W.2d at 314-15.
34. See 278 N.W.2d at 314-15. Recently, the Workers' Compensation Court of Ap-
peals recognized that Brooks does not mandate reimbursement of intervenors under every
circumstance:
The Supreme Court has not said that an intervenor may sit by, wait and later
claim full reimbursement. These are matters of equity and policy. I would hold,
therefore, that in the circumstances in the instant case, the failure of the inter-
venor to intervene until July 28, 1978, and failure to make any attempt to enter
into the settlement negotiations at any time prior to the filing of the Supplemen-
tal Award . . . tips the delicate balance against the intervenor's interest.
Blanchard v. Pearson Candy Co., No. 330-20-3537, slip op. at 4 (Minn. Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1979).
35. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 60, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1295
(amending MINN. STAT. § 176.521(1) (1978)). The amendment provides:
An agreement between an employee or his dependent and the employer or in-
surer to settle any claim, which is not upon appeal before the workers' compensa-
tion court of appeals, for compensation under this chapter is valid where it has
been executed in writing and signed by the parties, and mtervenors in the mater,
and the division has approved the settlement and made an award thereon. If the
matter is upon appeal before the workers' compensation court of appeals, the
workers' compensation court of appeals is the approving body.
Id. (emphasis added).
This amendment was passed in a special session called, in part, to act upon a proposal
for comprehensive revision of the Minnesota workers' compensation law. See Act of June
7, 1979, ch. 3, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256 (to be codified in scattered sections of
MINN. STAT. ch. 176). The section concerning the validity of compensation claim settle-
ments was but one of the amended sections.
36. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 60, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1295
(amending MINN. STAT. § 176.521(1) (1978)). The Workers' Compensation Court of Ap-
peals has recommended that a special rule covering this contingency be engrafted upon
the amended statute:
The intervenor would further have to establish that it has in fact entered into
such negotiations in good faith toward compromising its claim; it would not be
allowed to wait the employee and employer-insurer put, as it were, and then
claim full reimbursement; it would have the burden of establishing that it has
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to compel the injured worker and the compensation carrier to go to trial
over the claim, whether they wish to or not.
By departing from Brooks, the amendment may give too much protec-
tion to health insurers. Brooks recognized that intervenors would be pro-
tected adequately if they were permitted to participate in settlement
negotiations. 3 7 In clarifying the language of a previous decision, the
Brooks court emphasized that it did not intend to fully reimburse inter-
venors who participate in negotiations but rigidly refuse to compromise
their claim for full reimbursement.38 Because the amendment does not
address this possibility, there is now no restraint upon the intervenor's
discretion in choosing whether to settle a claim.
While this legislation raises an important concern, the realities facing
intervenors in the settlement process provide some limitation on the pos-
sibility of unreasonable refusal to settle a claim. Recovery by the inter-
venor hinges upon the compensation claim of the worker. By compelling
litigation.of the workers' claim, the intervenor risks losing everything if
entered fully into the proceeding in order to strike a proper balance among the
interests of all parties....
... The employee must be allowed to settle his claim. The intervenor must
not be allowed to wait it out and be paid in full....
The recently enacted Workers' Compensation law provides that intervenors
shall sign the stipulation, but goes no further. The new Rule here suggested is
compatible with both previously effective Workers' Compensation laws and the
recently enacted legislation. It would permit effective handling of all cases in-
volving settlements.
Blanchard v. Pearson Candy Co., No. 330-20-3537, slip op. at 5-6 (Minn. Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1979) (dictum). The amended statute does not, however, provide for
placing upon intervenors the burden of proof in establishing good faith efforts to settle,
nor does it provide remedial measures when intervenors attempt to wait out the other
parties. Thus, it remains to be seen whether such a rule would be adopted, and if adopted,
whether it would be upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
37. See 278 N.W.2d at 314-15; note 30 supra and accompanying text.
38. In Repo v. Capitol Elevator Co., 312 Minn. 364, 252 N.W.2d 248 (1977), the
Minnesota court upheld reimbursement for an intervening health insurer after it success-
fully proved in a separate proceeding that the injury was work related. See id. at 367-70,
252 N.W.2d at 250-51. According to the Repo court, "[t]he employee can, of course,
choose to settle without the sickness and accident insurer's consent, but the insurer will
then be entitled to full reimbursement from the proceeds of the settlement." Id. at 369,
252 N.W.2d at 251.
The health insurers in Brooks argued that this language from Repo entitled them to
automatic reimbursement when the employee settled the compensation claim. Se Rela-
tor-Intervenor's Brief and Appendix (Brooks) at 7-8. Commenting on this language from
Repo, the Brooks court stated:
Nor, as the language may arguably be understood, did we intend that if settle-
ment is made without the health insurer's agreement, where it has been given
notice of the negotiations for settlement, participates in them and in the proceed-
ing for approval, but adamantly refuses to agree to compromise its claim for full
reimbursement or to agree to an approval of the settlement, that the health in-
surer should nevertheless be entitled to full reimbursement.
278 N.W.2d at 314-15. For a discussion of Repo, see notes 11, 18 supra.
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the decision does not favor the worker.39 On the other hand, if the inter-
venor compels trial of the claim, the intervenor's gamble might result in
a higher award for the worker and full-dollar reimbursement for the in-
tervenor. Thus, without incurring attorney's fees, the intervenor, by re-
fusing to settle, can force the employee to prove at trial the intervenor's
claim that the injury was work related.
40
The real consequences of Brooks and the 1979 amendment are clear.
Settlement of the claim by the worker constitutes an admission or ir-
rebuttable presumption with respect to the health insurer that the injury
was occupational in nature. 4' In effect, intervenors are made necessary
39. The intervenor is entitled to reimbursement only "if there is a successful workers'
compensation proceeding." Repo v. Capitol Elevator Co., 312 Minn. 364, 369, 252
N.W.2d 248, 251 (1977).
40. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized the possible unfairness of compel-
ling an injured worker to try the claim. In Lang v. William Bros. Boiler & Mfg. Co., 250
Minn. 521, 85 N.W.2d 412 (1957), in which a workers' compensation insurer intervened in
the employee's third-party tort action, the supreme court denied the insurer's right of
subrogation to the employee's settlement award, stating:
The vice of preventing settlement at all without the consent of the employer or
his insurer is that the employee may then be put in a position where, against his
will, he must face the uncertainties of a trial. While both employer and em-
ployee face the risk that the result of the trial will not equal the amounts offered
in settlement or the amount which must be paid in compensation, the em-
ployee's burden probably is greater than that of the employer in that ordinarily
the employee has no great resources upon which to rely if the gamble of a trial
fails, whereas the insurer not only has greater resources but the case as to it is
only one of many.
Id. at 528, 85 N.W.2d at 418.
In Brooks, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals also recognized this potential
for unfairness, emphasizing that intervening health insurers have no right to compel the
injured worker to try the claim at the worker's own expense. According to the court of
appeals:
[I]t is [intervenors'] obligation to submit proof of their claims and to also prove
compensability of the employee's claim, and the liability of the respective par-
ties. The employee cannot be forced to do this at the risk of loss of his case. As
intervenors they have a right to proceed. They cannot expect somebody else to
prove their claim for them.
Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc., No. 476-48-5162, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 1977), reo'd, 278 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. 1979).
41. Vetsch v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, 283 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn. 1979). The
employee in Vetsch had received more than $4500 in benefits from his health insurer,
under an insurance policy that excluded injuries covered by any workers' compensation
law. See id. at 885. Four months after his injury, the employee filed a claim for workers'
compensation benefits. See id. Before approval of settlement of the compensation claim,
the health insurer intervened seeking reimbursement. See id. at 886. The intervenor's
claim was denied on the grounds that there was no evidence indicating that the claim
"arose out of the course and scope of [the worker's] employment," id., and the supreme
court reversed. See id. at 885. Expressly relying on Brooks, the Vesch court held that the
intervenor became automatically entitled to full reimbursement once it was excluded from
settlement negotiations and award proceedings. See id. at 886. According to the court, "it
does not strain logic to consider that this election [to seek workers' compensation benefits]
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parties to settlement negotiations and award proceedings. 42 On the posi-
tive side, by compelling the parties to include the intervenor in settle-
ment negotiations, the health insurer is less dependent on cooperation of
the worker in a separate proceeding 43 and the likelihood of expensive
investigations into the work-related nature of the injury is diminished. 44
Compromise is encouraged when the work-related nature of an injury is
uncertain4 5 and the likelihood of double recovery is diminished. 46 Be-
cause of the greater certainty of reimbursement for health insurers, im-
mediate payment of medical and hospital bills is encouraged. 47 Finally,
by the employee constitutes an admission or irrebuttable presumption, with respect to the
health insurer only, that the injury was occupational in nature." Id. at 887.
The Vetsch court did not discuss the possibility of an intervenor's unreasonable refusal
to settle because the issue was not presented to the court and because the holding in Vetsch
was expressly predicated upon the earlier decision in Brooks. See id. at 886. Similarly, the
Vetsch court did not consider the effect of the 1979 amendment, because the decision was
rendered before the effective date of the amendment. Compare id. at 884 (decision ren-
dered on July 6, 1979) with Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 71, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1256, 1297 (no effective date provided for section 60) and MINN. STAT. § 645.02 (1978)
(each act becomes effective on August 1 next following enactment unless different date
specified in act).
42. Cf Vetsch v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, 283 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Minn. 1979)
("Once [the intervenor] was excluded from these [negotiation and award] proceedings, it
became automatically entitled, under Brooks, to full reimbursement of the costs incurred
on behalf of the employee."); Brooks v. A.M.F., Inc., 278 N.W.2d at 316 ("It is hoped that
our holding will motivate the employer-insurer and the employee to include the inter-
venor in all settlement negotiations, knowing that the intervenor may be fully reimbursed
if excluded.").
43. The Brooks court recognized that under pre-Brooks law, health insurers were de-
pendent upon the worker's cooperation. See 278 N.W.2d at 315 ("Realistically, the em-
ployee, who has already received benefits from both the health insurer and workers'
compensation, may have little reason to cooperate with the health insurer in proving that
his injury was work related.").
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.; note 26 supra and accompanying text.
47. The intervenor in Brooks argued that health insurance benefits might be withheld
in a doubtful case until the issue of whether the injury was work related had been deter-
mined. See Relator-Intervenor's Brief and Appendix (Brooks) at 11. Recognizing the pos-
sible creation of an advantage for intervenors by its decision, the Brooks court stated that
"health insurers are encouraged to continue to promptly pay doubtful claims." 278
N.W.2d at 316; accord, Lemmer v. Batzli Elec. Co., 267 Minn. 8, 19, 125 N.W.2d 434, 441
(1963).
A 1979 amendment to the workers' compensation law resolves the problem by requir-
ing health insurers to make immediate payment of medical benefits, even though the in-
jury may be work related. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 52, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1256, 1290-91 (amending MINN. STAT. § 176.191(3) (1978)).
If a health insurer does not make immediate payment of health insurance benefits,
and such benefits are wrongfully withheld, the health insurer may risk liability for puni-
tive damages. See Bradt, Third Party Actions, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION SKILLS AND
PRAcTICE 81 (Minn. Continuing Legal Education 1979); cf. MINN. STAT. § 549.20(1)
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the burden of economic loss from work-related injury is shifted out of the
private insurance sector and back into industry.
48
Brooks and the 1979 amendment may also adversely affect the interests
of workers. Because the intervenor will be reimbursed, a higher settle-
ment will be required for the worker to receive the same benefit that
might have been available under pre-Brooks law. A worker may be hesi-
tant to settle if a substantial portion of the settlement offer goes to the
intervenor. This effect directly contravenes the judicial policy of encour-
aging out-of-court settlements.49 Further, once the injured worker has
received health insurance benefits, if the potential workers' compensation
award does not exceed the health insurer's reimbursement, the worker
might be discouraged from filing a claim. The intervenor would then be
relegated to proving that the injury was work related in a separate court
proceeding5O Health insurers would again face the pre-Brooks dilemma;
many small claims are not worth litigating in a separate court proceed-
ing. The effect of this would be to remove the burden of economic loss
caused by work-related injury from industry and place it upon the
worker and private health insurer, an effect that the Brooks procedure
was specifically designed to prevent.5 1
With respect to compensation carriers, the effect of Brooks and the
1979 amendment may be to distort the industrial burden of paying for
work-related injury. To the extent injured employees must now seek
higher awards,52 industry will be paying larger awards than under pre-
Brooks law. If a large potential for reimbursement to health insurers dis-
suades injured workers from pursuing their compensation claims,53 in-
dustry will, in effect, receive a windfall advantage by not paying
otherwise valid claims. Finally, because settlements can be obtained only
with the permission of the intervening health insurer,54 compensation
carriers will have less freedom to choose whether to settle a claim.
The Legislature's amendment was made with undue haste. The dust
of Brooks had not yet settled and the full impact of the decision, as it
affects compensation settlements, was not given time to be appreciated.5 5
While the amendment codifies the Brooks result in many respects, it does
(1978) (punitive damages recoverable in civil actions upon proof that acts of defendant
show willful indifference to the rights or safety of others).
48. Cf. 278 N.W.2d at 315 (basic principle of workers' compensation is to place bur-
den of loss on industry).
49. See generally note 28 supra and accompanying text.
50. Cf MINN. STAT. § 555.02 (1978) (Minnesota's Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act permits any interested party to a written contract to seek declaratory relief determin-
ing rights or other legal relations under the contract.).
51. See 278 N.W.2d at 315.
52. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
53. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
54. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
55. Brooks was decided on March 30, 1979. See 278 N.W.2d at 310. Less than three
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not deal with the possibility of unreasonable refusal to settle. Perhaps
the Legislature will find it prudent to evaluate the impact of Brooks and
the 1979 amendment in the future. An alternative is needed to restore
the balance that Brooks attempted to strike. A practical solution would
be for the Legislature to devise a means by which the reasonableness of a
settlement offer to an intervenor could be determined. 56 Such a mecha-
months later, on June 7, the Legislature's amendment was approved. See Act of June 7,
1979, ch. 3, § 60, 1979 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1295.
The provision requiring intervenors to sign the settlement agreement before it could
be validated by the Workers' Compensation Division was inserted on April 16, 1979, as an
amendment to S.F. 1047, 71st Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1979). See MINN. S. JOUR. 890-91
(1979). This bill, as amended, was passed by the Senate on April 26. See MINN. S. JOUR.
1314 (1979).
On May 16, the House of Representatives deleted the amendment from S.F. 1047,
and then passed the bill. See MINN. H.R. JOUR. 2486-88 (1979).
The Senate's version of a comprehensive workers' compensation bill, S.F. 917, 71st
Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1979), was also amended to require that intervenors sign a settle-
ment agreement before it could be validated by the Workers' Compensation Division. See
MINN. S. JouR. 901, 911 (1979). S.F. 917, as amended, was passed by the Senate on May
17. See MINN. S. JOUR. 2566-67 (1979).
The House of Representatives' version of a comprehensive workers' compensation
bill, H.F. 946, 71st Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1979), also was amended to protect intervenors
in workers' compensation settlements. See MINN. H.R. JOUR. 1952, 1996 (1979). H.F.
946, as amended, was passed by the House of Representatives on May 18. See MINN. H.R.
JOUR. 2650-51 (1979).
The Conference Committee retained the intervenor signature provision, which was
approved by the Senate on May 21. See MINN. S. JOUR. 3555 (1979). The House of
Representatives failed to vote on the bill during the 1979 regular session. Both the Senate
and the House approved the Conference Committee version, S.F. 1, 71st Minn. Legis., Ex.
Sess. (1979), on May 24. See MINN. S. JoUR. 3590 (1979); MINN. H.R. JOUR. 27-28 (Ex.
Sess. 1979).
56. The Brooks court apparently envisioned the possibility of having the Workers'
Compensation Division determine what amount the intervenor should be reimbursed. See
278 N.W.2d at 316 n.4 ("It is conceivable that the parties participating in the approval
proceedings could agree that the approving officer determine the issue of the amount of
the intervenor's reimbursement conclusively or subject to further review by the court of
appeals.").
One commentator had proposed a solution to the problems faced by intervenors
before Brooks was decided. See Bradt, supra note 47, at 84-85. Mr. Bradt notes that "the
intervenor should not be allowed, by its refusal to acquiesce, to prevent a compromise
settlement by the employee." Id. at 85. He proposes the following solution:
Where the intervenor refuses to acquiesce and accept a compromise of its own
claims, the judge to whom the Stipulation for Settlement is submitted for ap-
proval should determine the percentage of the employee's total claim repre-
sented by the settlement, and award to the intervenor from such settlement a
percentage of intervenor's claim proportionate to that received by the employee.
Id. Under this proposal, an intervenor does not become entitled automatically to full
reimbursement when the worker and the compensation carrier settle a claim. Instead, if a
worker has a claim reasonably worth $10,000, and settles the claim for 70% of that
amount, or $7,000, the intervening health insurer will be entitled to reimbursement of 70%
of the amount it previously paid under its health insurance policy.
This solution would apply only when the intervening health insurer unreasonably
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nism could be used to prevent intervenors from receiving undue benefits
because of their unreasonable refusal to settle a workers' compensation
claim.
Brooks represents a trend, culminated by the 1979 amendment, that
has markedly increased the protection accorded health insurers who in-
tervene in workers' compensation proceedings. Whether intervenors
have been overprotected at the expense of the worker and the compensa-
tion carrier is a matter still to be resolved. It will be important for future
legislation and judicial decisions to make certain that intervenors' newly
established rights are exercised with restraint.
refuses to settle the claim. See id. Partial reimbursement for the health insurer seems
justifiable under the theory that a settlement does not establish liability under workers'
compensation law. See, e.g., 278 N.W.2d at 311 ("In the stipulation, each of the employers
denied primary liability, and Brooks expressly acknowledged that the injury complained
of did not arise in the course of his employment."). But see Vetsch v. Schwan's Sales
Enterprises, 283 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn. 1979) ("[It does not strain logic to consider that
this election [to settle] by the employee constitutes an admission or irrebuttable presump-
tion, with respect to the health insurer only, that the injury was occupational in nature.").
California has adopted a solution to this problem that is similar to that envisioned by
Mr. William Bradt. Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 4903.1(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) with
Bradt, supra note 47, at 85. In a 1974 decision, the California Supreme Court ruled that
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board had no authority to reduce a hospital's lien
against a compensation award after the award had been settled out of court. See Kaiser
Foundation Hosps. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 13 Cal. 3d 20, 21, 528 P.2d
766, 767, 117 Cal. Rptr. 678, 679 (1974). Perhaps in response to Kaiser, California now
has a statute permitting a workers' compensation referee to reduce lien claims on a pro
rata basis, if the lien claimant refuses to agree to the out-of-court settlement. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 4903.1(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
When the parties propose that the case be disposed of by way of a compro-
mise and release agreement, in the event the lien claimant [health insurer] does
not agree to the amount allocated to it, then the referee shall determine the
potential recovery and reduce the amount of the lien [against the employee's
recovery] in the ratio of the applicant's recovery to the potential recovery in full
satisfaction of its lien claim.
Pennsylvania law permits health insurers to be subrogated to compensation awards, if
this right is agreed upon by the parties, or established at a hearing before the workers'
compensation board. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
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